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TAX NOTES, September 6,1993 
'DEATH AND TAXES' 
AND HYPOCRISY 
by John Lee 
I. Introduction 
The intended implication of the "death and taxes" 
poem published by Rep. Thomas Ewing (R-Ill.) in the 
June 30,1993, Congressional Record, and reprinted in Tax 
Notes Guly 12, 1993, p. 235), is that the Clinton tax plan 
is aimed at the common person largely through con-
sumption taxes. Rep. Ewing states in the Congressional 
Record that, in response to a survey, he received the 
poem from one constituent "expressing their [sic] con-
cern about the Clinton tax package," 139 Congo Rec. H 
4281 (House, June 3D, 1993, Daily Ed.). This is rich, 
albeit probably unintended, irony. First, the ultimate 
inspiration of Rep. Ewing's doggerel is the pop~list 
"Mellon ditty" published in the 1924 CongressIOnal 
Record, where it fit much more aptly the tax plan of 
Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon, under 
whom, the joke ran, three Republican presidents 
served, than the watered-down Ewing piece applies to 
the Clinton tax plan. Part of Mellon's tax plan in 1924 
was to reduce progressivity still further by cutting the 
top ordinary rate a second time; Clinton's tax plan, in 
contrast, would restore further some of the progressivity 
lost in the Mellon-like ordinary and capital gains cuts 
of 1981. The Ewing poem, of course, omits the populist 
anti-rich elements of the original. l Second, the common 
thematic element to both ditties is a heavy use of con-
sumption taxes, which in recent political debate has 
been more preferred by Republican administrations 
than the Clinton administration. Third, the Clinton tax 
plan's reliance in part on consumption taxes, such as 
energy taxes, appears in large part politically respon-
sive to the Republicans' use over the past 25 years of 
tax revolt rhetoric. 
165 Congo Rec. (Part 3) 3031-32 (House Feb. 23, 1924) 
(Remarks of Rep. William Lankford, D-Ga.). He introduced 
the "Mellon ditty" as follows: "We find the Secretary of the 
Treasury at one time advocating a sales tax, at another sug-
gesting three cents postage on ordinary letters, and a tax on 
all checks drawn on banks regardless of their size. At all times 
we find him urging less taxes for the millionaire profiteer and 
more for the common folks. So it is most evident that his plan 
is to tax more and more the poor and to finally relieve entirely 
the very rich." For identical, contemporaneous sentiments by 
other members of Congress, see notes 10 and 40 infra. 
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II. Populist Origins of the Mellon Ditty 
While most workers were exempted from the federal 
income tax from the early 1920s to the early 1940s due 
to generous personal exemptions,2 they were instead 
regressively and heavily burdened by excise taxes. This 
pattern of (regressive) consumption taxes as well as 
Mellon's championing further cuts in the top in-
dividual rates after he had already gutted real progres-
sivi ty by extensive preferences prompted the "Mellon 
ditty. "3 
The real Mellon plan is summed up in the following: 
Tax the people, tax with care, 
Tax to help the millionaire; 
Tax the farmer; tax his fowl; 
Tax the dog and tax his howl; 
Tax his hen and tax her egg; 
And let the bloomin' mudsill beg. 
Tax them just all you can, 
This is, friends, the Mellon plan. 
20nly 2.5 million individuals paid federal income taxes in 
1925 out of perhaps 30 million workers. See Kornhauser, "The 
Origins of Capital Gains Taxation: What's Law Got to Do With 
It?" 39 SW L.J. 869, 873 n. 18 (1985). The $2,000 personal 
exemption for married taxpayers was worth over $15,600 in 
1990 dollars. 
During this entire period, the individual income tax 
applied to a small fraction of the population, and only 
a small fraction of income was subject to tax. Between 
1918 and 1920, taxable individual income tax returns 
covered an average of 9.5 percent of the U .S. popula-
tion. Between 1921 and 1929, the comparable figure 
was 5.2 percent of the population. Similarly, in 1918, 
taxable income was only 13 percent of personal income; 
in 1926, taxable income was only 14 percent of personal 
income. Furthermore, most taxpayers had - by 
today's standards - very low incomes. In 1920, 7.3 
million returns were filed . Returns with less than 
$2,000 of income represented 37 percent of all returns 
and included 17 percent of income. Returns with in-
comes of less than $3,000 represented 72 percent of 
total retums and 43 percent of income. Finally, 91 per-
cent of returns (with 64 percent of income) had incomes 
below $5,000. The top rate of 77 percent applied to 
taxable income over $1 million . There were only about 
30 such returns. 
Treasury Office of Tax Analysis, Report to the Congress on the 
Capital Gains Tax Reductions of 197849 n. 14 (Sept. 1985). For 
a breakdown of personal income by sources and income classes 
(and numbers of taxpayers in each class) for 1921, see Hearings 
on H.R. 6715 (Revenue Act of 1924) before the Senate Finance 
Committee, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 304-06 (1924) (Tables sub-
mitted by Sen. Andrieus Jones, D-N.M.), reprinted in 2 Reams, 
The Internal Revenue Acts of the United States 1909-1950: Legis-
lative Histories, Law and Administrative Documents (William H. 
Hein & Co. 1979) (1909-1950 Legislative Histories). 
365 Congo Rec. (Part 3) 3031-32 (House Feb. 23, 1924) 
(Remarks of Rep. Lankford, D-Ga.) (Emphasis added to high-
light the most direct "lifts" in Ewing poem). 
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Tax his pig and tax his squeal, 
Tax his boots, run down at heel ; 
Tax his horses, tax his lands, 
Tax his blisters on his hands; 
Tax him just all you can; 
This is, friends, the Mellon plan. 
Tax his plow and tax hi s clothes, 
Tax his rag that wipes his nose; 
Tax his house and tax his bed, 
Tax the bald spot on his head; 
Tax the ox and tax the ass; 
Tax his "Henry," tax the gas; 
Tax the road that he must pass 
And make him travel o'er the grass; 
Tax him just all you can; 
This is, friends, the Mellon plan . 
Tax his cow and tax the calf, 
Tax him if he dares to laugh; 
He is but a common man, 
So tax the cuss just all you can, 
This is, friends, the Mellon plan. 
Tax the lab'rer, but be discreet, 
Tax him for walking on the s treet; 
Tax his bread and tax his meat, 
Tax his shoes clear off his feet . 
Tax the pay roll, tax the sale, 
Tax all his hard-earned paper kale; 
Tax his pipe and tax his smoke, 
Teach him government is no joke; 
Tax him just a ll you can, 
This is, friends , the Mellon plan . 
Tax their coffins, tax their shrouds, 
Ta x thei r souls beyond the clouds; 
Tax "small" business, tax the shop; 
Tax their incomes, tax their s tocks; 
Tax the living, tax the dead; 
Tax the unborn before they're fed; 
Tax the water, tax the air, 
Tax the sunlight if you dare; 
Tax them all, tax them well, 
Take it a ll, don't leave a smell ; 
Tax the good roads, tax the s tones, 
Tax the farmers, tax their loans, 
Kill their credit, raise the ir rates, 
Tax the cities, tax the States; 
Save the profiteer his gold , 
Tax the poor, tax the old; 
Tax them jus t all you can, 
This is, friends, the Mellon plan. 
III. 'Symbolic' Progressivity in the 1920s and 1930s 
Ogden Mills, who had been a Wall Street tax lawyer, 
a member of the House Ways and Means Committee 
in the ea rly 1920s, and President Hoover's last Secre-
tary of Treasury, pointed out in the 1932 S nate Finance 
Committee Hearings that the real tax burden was sta te 
and local taxes, which were borne by low - and 
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moderate-income taxpayers.4 The federal individual 
income tax was, until the Revenue Act of 1942, only a 
token "class" tax on the rich and well- to-d o.5 Secretary 
Mellon already had achieved a reduction in the top 
individual rate from 77 to 58 percent in the Revenue 
Act of 1921, and was in the process of persuading 
Congress to cut the top rate further as it did in 1924 
and 1926, ultimately down to 25 percent.6 But even 
these reduced nominal top individual income tax rates 
did not tell the full story. During the boom year of 1925, 
almost 50 percent of the individual income covered by 
the "class" income tax was long-term (two-year or 
longer holding period) capita l gains (85-percent public 
s tock), subject to a flat tax of 12.5 percen t,? earlier in-
troduced by Mellon. The top 10,000 individuals in in-
come, who garnered over 90 percent of the benefits of 
this preference,8 paid half of the individual income 
taxes.9 And the capital gains preference was just one 
of many Mellon introduced in the Revenue Act of 1921 
4Hearings on the Revenlle Act of 1932 before the Senate Finance 
Com mittee, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932) (Secretary Ogden 
Mills), reprinted in 101909-1950 Legislative Histories. This pat-
tern continued under President Franklin Roosevelt, not-
withstanding soak-the-rich rhetoric after his first term (ap-
parently to head off Huey Long's populist income tax 
proposals). Due to continuation of the broad personal exemp-
tions, the federal income tax remained a tax only on higher-
income taxpayers, who maintained low effective rates through 
the capital gains preference, while the masses remained sub-
ject to regressive excise taxes. In short only" symbolic reform" 
was affected by FDR income tax changes. Cf. Leff, The Limits 
of Symbolic Reform 2-3, 288-93 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1984) 
("symbolism" consists of using "political enemies" in political 
discourse, such as "economic royalists," which deflects and 
reassur~s reformists, or at least the populace, thereby under-
mining reform efforts). Roosevelt espoused soak-the-rich in-
come tax policies, but regressive excise taxes raised even more 
revenues compared to income tax returns during the New 
Deal era than in the 19205 or late 1940s. ld. 
5Jones, "Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda 
in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II," 
37 Buffalo L. Rev. 685, 686 (1988) (increase from seven million 
taxpayers in 1940 to 45 million in 1945). 
6The Revenue Act of 1921 reduced the maximum rate from 
73 to 58 percent. Pub. Law 67-98, section 210 (normal tax of 
8 percent) and section 211 (maximum surtax of 50 percent on 
net income over $200,000), 42 Stat. 227, 233, 237. Mellon 
directed further reductions in the Revenue Act of 1924, and 
the Revenue Act of 1926 reduced the top rate to 25 percent. 
Pub. Law 69-20, sections 210 (maximum normal rate of 5 
percent) and 211 (maximum surtax of 20 percent of net in-
come in excess of $100,000),44 Stat. 9, 21-23. 
7Report of a Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Proposed Revision of the Revenue LAws, 1938, 75th Cong., 
3d Sess. 90 (1938) (Vinson Report), reprinted in 103 1909-1950 
Legislative Histories . 
BThose with $100,000 or more in annual income ($730,000 
in 1990 dollars) . Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxa-
tion, Supplemental Report on Capital Gains and Losses, Vol. 1, 
Part 7, p. 5 (1929), reprinted in 117 1909-1950 Legislative His-
tories. 
9Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1938, before the House Com-
mittee on Ways & Means, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 116-21 (1938) 
(Treasury Exhibits), reprinted in 211909-1950 Legislative His-
tories. 
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to reduce the burden on high-income individuals. lo In 
short, the 1920s (and the 1930s as well) saw consump-
tion taxes on the masses and both nominally and 
decreasingly progressive income taxes on only the rich 
and well-to-do, which is what some supporting a va lue 
added tax call for todayll 
IV. Symbo lic Progressivity from the 1960s to the 
19 80s: Mellon 's Legacy Lives O n 
Four and five decades later, in the 1960s and 19705, 
h igh-incom e individuals achieved an effective federa l 
income tax rate of 35 percent as the top ordinary rate 
gradually was cut from 90 percent to 70 percent on 
unearned income. Sen . Russell Long, D-La., Senate 
Finance Committee member and manager of the Senate 
floor debate on the Revenue Act of 1964, disclosed in 
the 1963 capital gains debate that the vast majority of 
very top-bracket individuals (e.g., yearly income of $1 
million in 1963 dollars or over $4 million in 1990 dollars) 
used the Mellon-originated capital gains preference (75 
percent of their income consisted of capital gains) to 
obtain "surprisingly" low effective rates, viz. 22 per-
cen t w hen the top individual ordinary rate wa s s till 90 
percen t - high-income individuals in general had an 
effective rate of around 35 percent.1 2 The individual 
capital gains preference during this era was a maxi-
mum rate of 25 percent for the large capital gains in-
come and a 50-percent deduction for the small capital 
IOKornhauser, "Section 1031: We Don 't Need Another 
Hero," 60 So. Ca l. L. Rev. 397 (1987). Professor Kornhaus r, 
using a historical research approach, has convincingly 
hypothesized several factors involved in the enactment of 
section 1031 in 1921 and the amendments in 1923 and 1924: 
(1) concern about whether capita l gains were income; (2) con-
fusion about when realization occurs; (3) sympathy for a con-
sumption theory of income; and (4) economic and political 
conditions encouraging an economic policy in the tax laws to 
foster investment. Id. at 411, 400, 438-439 (the trick was for 
Congress to encourage investment while maintaining 
nominally progressive ra tes, which capital gains preference 
and tax-free like-kind exchanges accomplished) . The populist 
rhetoric in opposition to applying the predecessor of section 
1031 to investments including stock strikingly paralleled the 
introduction to the Mellon ditty. Rep. John Nance "Cactus 
Jack" Garner, D-Tex., explained how Mellon persuaded the 
Senate Finance Committee to so extend it: "Why, it happened 
just as it always will as long as the Treasury Department has 
the viewpoint of taxation that it now has. That will happen 
as long as you have a House or a Senate that obeys the man-
dates of the Treasury Department. It is the viewpoint of those 
who desire to relieve the heavy taxpayer from his taxes and 
continue the taxes upon the masses of the people, as they have 
done in this bill." 61 Congo Rec. 8073 (Part 8) (House Nov. 21, 
1921) (Remarks of Rep. Garner, D-Tex.). Th.is was rhetoric as 
to the "class" income tax since it did not tax the masses. See 
note 2 supra. 
llGraetz, "Revisiting the Income Tax vs . Consumption Tax 
Debate," 57 Tax Notes 1437, 1440 (Dec. 7, 1992). 
12110 Congo Rec. (Part 2) 1438 (Senate Feb. 1964) (Remarks 
of Floor Manager Senator Long). 
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gains incomeP The "Surrey Papers"14 pointed out in 
1968 that wealthy individuals with large amounts (and 
percentages) of capital gains income often achieved 
substantially lower effective rates than the 25-percent 
alternate maximum capital gains rate by offsetting or 
"sheltering" the taxable income remaining after the 
50-percent capital gains deduction with other deduc-
tions.1S Assistant Secretary of Treasury Stanley Surrey, 
testifying at the end of lame duck President Johnson's 
administration in late 1968, revealed that for about 75 
percent of the individual taxpayers with over $1 million 
in actual annual income, the effective income tax rate 
clustered in the area between 20 and 30 percent, com-
pared with about 60 percent of the individual tax-
payers with between $20,000 and $50,000 of actual in-
come who clustered in the same effective rate range. 
Moreover, while the effective rate increased with actual 
income of up to $50,000 and flattened from $50,000 to 
$100,000, the effective rates began to decrease above 
$100,000 in income. 16 He further testified that these 
figures did not appear to be a one-shot phenomenon 
as to high-income individuals. The capital gains prefer-
ence constituted the primary reason for these low ef-
13This two-track approach Originated in the Revenue Act 
of 1938 with these express targets in mind. Confidential Hear-
ings in H.R. 9682 (Revenue Act of 1938) before the Senate Finance 
Comm. (Part 1), 74th Cong., 3d Sess. 11, 15-6 (1938), reprinted 
in 22 1909-1950 Legislative Hearings (Statement of Under-
secretary of the Treasury Roswell Magill). 
14United States Treasury Department, Tax Reform Studies 
and Proposals (Parts 1 through 4), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Comm. Prnt 1969), reprinted in 22 and 23 Reams Tax Reform 
- 1969: A Legis/ative History of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
(William S. Hein & Co. 1991) (1969 Legis/ative History) (pre-
pared in 1968 and published in 1969). 
1SSurrey Papers (Part 1), note 14 supra, at 84-86; (Part 2) at 
142-45. Therefore, Treasury proposed that nonbusiness 
deductions be allocated between taxable and the more com-
mon sources of tax-exempt income and only the former por-
tion be allowed as a deduction. ld. (Part 2) at 145-46. The 
other part of the Surrey antishelter package was a minimum 
tax on tax preferences. The Surrey Papers computed the min-
imum tax base by adding back to taxable income (in the order 
of revenue importance) (1) one-half of net long-term capital 
gain, (2) tax-exempt interest, (3) charitable contributions of 
appreciated property, and (4) percentage depletion in excess 
of cost depletion. Surrey Papers (Part 1), supra, at 110 (ranking 
of items reducing taxes for high-income taxpayers); id. (Part 
2), supra, at 136-40 (minimum tax base), reprinted in 22 1969 
Legislative History. Surrey proposed a graduated minimum 
tax rate of 7 to 35 percent (roughly parallel to half of 
graduated rates under the regular rates), limited to a maxi-
mum rate of 25 percent in the case of unrealized appreciation 
in capital assets taxed at death. ld. (Part 2) at 141-42. Treasury 
knew that substantially all of the tax preference items 
reported by individuals would consist of the long-term capi-
tal gains preference (over 80 percent, as it turned out). Thus, 
the realized capital gains of wealthy taxpayers would have 
been taxed in the 30-percent range rather than in the low 
20-percent range. 
16Ironicallyand apparently unintentionally, this pattern of 
increase and then decline in effective rates was mirrored by 
the effective rates by income class produced by the 33-percent 
"bubble" under the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
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fective ratesY By the early 1980s, high-income in-
dividuals as a whole (those with at least $200,000 in 
annual income) after over a decade of restrictions on 
tax shelters, had an effective rate of around 22 percent 
when the maximum ordinary rate was 50 percent. IS By 
the 1980s, tax shelter deductions (principally deprecia-
tion and interest deductions as to depreciable real es-
tate) played a much more important role in lower ef-
fective rates at the top. In both periods, these effective 
rates were averages with 25 percent of the high-income 
taxpayers paying an effective rate much closer to the 
nominal rates, e.g., 50 to 60 percent in the early 19605, 
and 75 percent paying a much lower effective rate than 
the average effective rate. 
"Cats and dogs" high-income directed deficit-
reducing tax legislation in 1982, 1984, 1987, and 1990, 
together with the 1986 restrictions on tax shelters and 
capital gains, recaptured about half of the lost progres-
sivity.19 The effective rate at the top currentl y is about 
28 percent. 
v. Progressivity and Clinton Income Tax Proposals 
The tax revolt of the American people, sparked by 
the passage in a 1978 California referendum of Propos i-
tion 13, was the political foundation for the capital 
gains tax cut in 1978 and the top ordinary income and 
capital gains cuts in 1981.20 Congressional proponents 
of these cuts argued in political debate "that lower 
taxes on capital gains will stimula te investment, create 
more jobs, broaden the tax base, and increase federal 
revenues."21 But Republicans won presidential elec-
tions in the 19805 with the key issue of painting op-
ponents as tax-and-spend Democrats, which to many 
was code for lower taxes on both the upper and middle 
17Hearings on the Subject of Tax Reform (Tax Reform 1969) 
before the House Ways and Means Comm. (Part 4), 91st Cong., 
1st Sess. 1592, 1598-99 (1969), reprinted in 4 1969 Legislative 
History. 
1SSee Lee "Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly 
Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations and the 
Tax Legislative Process," 8 Va. Tax Rev. 57,70-71 n. 43 (1988). 
Icrrhe 1986 act's intended increase in corporate effective 
rates was thought at the time to restore progressivity (on the 
assumption that corporate taxes are borne by capital and not 
in part by labor). See Ott, "The Impact of the 1986 Tax Reform 
Act on Progressivity," 33 Tax Notes 1223, 1226 (Dec. 29, 1986). 
However~ the projected increase in corporate revenues failed 
to occur. 
20Hearings on H.R. 13511 (Revenue Act of 1978) before the 
Senate Finance Committee (Part 4), 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 834 
(Remarks of Senate Finance Committee member Roth, R-
Del.), reprinted in 6 Tax Reform 1978: A Legislative History of 
the Revenue Act of 1978 (William S. Hein & Co. 1978); see 
generally Dionne, Why Americans Hate Politics 246 (Simon & 
Shuster 1991); 34 Congo Q. Almanac 219 (1978); Kaiser & Rus-
sel, "A Middle Class Congress - Haves Over Have Nots," 
Washington Post, A-I, col. 3 (Sunday, Oct. 15, 1978). 
21124 Congo Rec. (Part 19) 2547 (House Aug. 10, 1978) 
(Remarks of Rep. William Steiger, R-Wis.) (sponsor of index-
ing basis for inflation in addition to traditional 50-percent 
deduction); accord, id. at 25428 (Remarks of Rep. Bill Frenzel, 
R-Minn.); id. at 25431 (Remarks of Rep. Bill Archer, R-Tex.). 
TAX NOTES, September 6,1993 
classes resulting in less government, i.e., less funding 
for programs seen as benefitting minorities.22 This 
lower taxes/less federal government/more racism 
theme, linked with support of the antiabortion and 
cultural "values" key issues of the religious right, con-
stituted the basis for the margin of victory in successful 
Republican presidential elections of the 1980s: the core 
Republican groups in L.A. Times/Gallup Poll terminol-
ogy of "Enterprisers" (high-income professionals, busi-
ness people, etc .) and "Moralists" (religious right, 
mostly white southern males) constituting about 25 
percent of the electorate, plus "Disaffected Democrats" 
(mostly white male Protestant working-class Demo-
crats in the South and white male Catholic/ethnic 
working class Democrats in the industrial midwest) 
and other conservative independents. 
By the end of the 1980s, populist and liberal Demo-
crats began to assert that trickle-down economics had 
failed (again)22a - only the rich got richer, the before-
tax real income of middle- and lower-income house-
holds stagnated or declined. This trend was exacer-
bated by the tax cuts of 1978 and 1981. The effective 
combined federal income and payroll tax rate for the 
top declined 25 percent from 1978-1990, while effective 
rates for the middle stayed constant and the effective 
rate at the bottom rose after taking payroll or Social 
Security taxes into account.23 The attack on trickle-
down economics, dubbed class warfare by proponents 
of a renewed capital gains preference, first prevailed 
in modem times when President Bush, in pushing (in 
the 1990 budget negotiations) a renewed generic capi-
tal gains preference primarily benefitting the rich and 
at the same time very regressive user and excise taxes 
to reduce growth in the federal deficit, opened the door 
for the Democrats to paint the Republicans as the party 
of the rich.24 The ultimate triumph of this rhetoric was 
the successful 1992 Clinton presidential campaign. The 
voters most strongly supporting Clinton were those 
22Edsall & Dionne, "Democracy at Work: The Tax Revolt of 
the Masses," Washington Post, C-l, col. 4-C-2, col. 4 (Sunday, 
Oct. 14, 1990); T. Edsall & M. Edsall, Chain Reaction (W.W. 
Norton & Co. 1991); W. Greider, Who Will Tell the People, 88-89, 
96-97, 274-75 (Simon & Shuster 1992). See also note 38 infra. 
uOKevin Phillips, a leading populist political commen-
tator, demonstrates a pattern in the 18805,19205, and 1980s 
of "capitalist booms" in which the principal benefits of the 
boom went to the rich and trickled down to the next 10 to 20 
percent of Americans (the middle class in the earlier booms), 
but petered out below this level with stagnation or a decline 
in real disposable per capita income. K. Phillips, Boiling Point 
35, 89-92 (Random House 1993). Note that the first two of 
these booms were followed by severe depressions or "busts." 
ld. 
23Even more regressivity arose with increased state and 
local taxation - usually in the form of regressive sales or 
property taxes and almost flat state income taxes - as federal 
revenue sharing was reduced and new state regulation was 
federally mandated. E.J. Dionne, note 20 supra, at 319-20. 
24130 Cong. Rec. 10285 (House Oct. 16, 1990 Daily Ed.) 
(Remarks of Rep. Thomas Downey, D-N.Y.); E.J. Dionne, note 
20 supra, at 320. 
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who both were concerned about the future economy 
and felt that their standard of living was slipping. 25 
I A conservative Republican 's critique of the president's tax plan on the basis of populism simply is unfounded at best and a 'Big Lie' at worst 
Clinton charged in the preSidential televis ion 
"debates" (especially in the third debate), campaign 
speeches, and his book/program Putting People First: 
A National Economic Strategy for America26 that 1979-
1990 stagnation in pretax income of the middle 40 per-
cent of households and drop in income of the bottom 
40 percent, while the income of the top 20 percent alone 
increased (doubling at the top I-percent level), were 
due to a failed economic policy: trickle-down eco-
nomics - "The economic philosophy ... that you 
make the economy grow by putting more and more 
wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer people at the 
top, getting government out of the way, and trusting 
them to make the right decisions to invest and to create 
jobs."27 Clinton liked to encapsulate this aspect of the 
1980s distribution of income in the following "wonk-
bite" derived from The New York Times. "During the 
1980s, the wealthiest one percent of Americans got 70 
25Apple, "Clinton, Savoring Victory, Starts Sizing Up Job 
Ahead," New York Times A-I, col. 5 (Thursday, Nov. 5, 1992) 
(Final late edition); see also Phillips, "The Policies of Frustra-
tion," New York Times, section 6, p. 38, col. 2 (Sunday, April 
12, 1992); Brownstein, "Divided Economic Vision Blurs 
Democratic Outlook; Politics: Strategists See a Renewed Con-
sensus as Vital to Targeting What May Be the Only Chink in 
Bush's Armor," Los Angeles Times, A-I, col. 5 (Wednesday,July 
3, 1991). 
26 For 12 years, the driving idea behind American 
economic policy has been cutting taxes on the richest 
individuals and corporations and hoping that their 
new wealth would "trickle down" to the res t of us. 
This policy has failed. 
The Republicans in Washington have compiled the 
worst economic record in 50 years; the slowest eco-
nomic growth, slowest job growth, and slowest income 
growth since the Great Depression. During the 1980s, 
the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans got 70 percent of 
income gains. By the end of the decade, American 
CEOs were paying themselves 100 times more than 
their workers. Washington stood by while quick-buck 
artists brought down the savings and loan industry, 
leaving the rest of us with a $500 billion bill. 
While the rich cashed in, the forgotten middle class 
- those people who work hard and play by the rules 
- took it on the chin. They worked harder for less 
money and paid more taxes to a government that failed 
to produce what we need. 
Bill Clinton, Putting People First, 1-2 (1992). 
27Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton at Montgomery College 
Re: Education and Economics, Rockville, MD, electronically 
reproduced, 92 NEXIS (Sept. 2, 1992). 
1397 
COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT 
percent of income gains .... The rich got richer, while 
the middle class took it on the chin. "28 "And for the 
first time since the Roaring '20s, the top one percent of 
the American people now control more wealth than the 
bottom 90 percent."29 In the third d ebate, Clinton 
opened30 with the assertion that "middle-class 
Americans are basically the only group of Americans 
who've been taxed more in the 1980s and during the 
last 12 years, even though their incomes have gone 
down, the wealthiest Americans have been taxed much 
less, even though their incomes have gone Up."31 The 
1992 Democratic candidate for Vice President, Senator 
Al Gore, D-Tenn., declaimed that the rich had taken 
from the middle class during the 1980s,32 but Governor 
Clinton put it more accurately: 
No American would have begrudged ... [the 
rich being big winners in the 1980s] since we all 
want in this free enterprise system to at least 
believe our children might grow up to be rich. No 
one would have begrudged that if the rest of us 
had been helped. But in 1980 we had the highest 
28Id. The source of Clinton's statistic was Nasar, "The 1980s: 
A Very Good Time for the Very Rich," New York Times, A-I, 
col. 3 (Thursday, March 5, 1992) (top 1 percent earned 60 
percent; later CBO corrected unadjusted figure to 70 percent.). 
See generally Nasar, "The Richest Getting Richer: Now It's a 
Top Political Issue," New York Times, D-1, col. 1 (Monday, May 
11, 1992) ("'He [Clinton] was reading the paper that moming 
and went crazy: . . . 'The story proved a point he had been 
trying to make for months, so he added the statistic to his 
repertoire. '''). 
29Remarks by Governor Bill Clinton, note 27 supra. 
3<7he question asked was whether voters should be con-
cerned whether Clinton's promises (infrastructure, reform 
health care, reduce the deficit, and guarantee a college educa-
tion) could be kept with financial pain only for the rich. Much 
later in the debate, Clinton pledged not to raise taxes on the 
middle class to pay for (it appeared) investment incentives 
(possibly limited to targeted investment tax credit and tar-
geted capital gains), if taxes on the rich and foreign sub-
sidiaries would not pay for such incentives. 
31Putting People First, note 26 supra, at 2. Substitution of 
lower income for middle income would render Clinton's 
statement in the third debate more factually accurate, but less 
politically sound. Since the 1970s, Republicans have wooed 
the formerly Democratic white lower-middle and working 
class (male voters) with the mantra that the tax-and-spend 
Democrats exact higher taxes from them to give to the African 
Americans. See note 22 supra . 
32 That fact that our Nation is in recession is partly 
due to the fact that we have had this major change in 
the distribution of taxation in this country. 
• • • 
Middle-income families have seen their real income 
go down, a very slight increase in the top 20 percent, 
but look at the top 1 percent. Real incomes after taxes 
and after inflation adjustment have gone up 136 per-
cent. That is fine if it does not come at the expense of the 
rest of the country, but what we have done is we have 
increased, more than doubled the income of the top wealthiest 
1 percent by taking money away from middle-income 
Americans. 
(Footnote continued in next column.) 
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wages in the world. Now we're 13th. The census 
document itself shows that most Americans are 
working longer work weeks for lower wages, 
paying higher taxes on lower income, paying a 
bigger percentage of their income for housing and 
for health care, and yes, for education.33 
The Clinton/Gore campaign proposed to raise the 
income tax rate on families (husband and wife filing 
joint return) earning $200,000 or more a year to 36 
percent (then 31 percent at this level) with a lO-percent 
surtax commencing at the $1 million or more in income. 
President Clinton's 1993 tax plan followed these lines, 
but lowered the thresholds for the 36-percent bracket 
to around $140,000 in family income and for the 
"Millionaire's Surtax" to $250,000. This would raise the 
effective rate at the top to 33.1 percent. 34 The presi-
dent's tax plan thus calls for more progressivity, while 
the 1920s Mellon tax plan and its modern incarnation 
in the Reagan tax cuts in 1981 called for less . A conse r-
vative35 Republican'S critique of the president's tax 
plan on the basis of populism s imply is unfounded at 
best and a "Big Lie" at worst. 
(Footnote 32 continued.) 
Despite the flip-flop-flip on his "no new taxes" 
promise - in an election year confession, admitting he 
made a mistake by breaking his promise - George 
Bush has not had a conversion. If nothing else, he is 
consistent. In this case, consistently pushing for tax 
breaks for the rich; more for those who already have 
more thanks to a decade of Reagan-Bush economics, 
already pay less in taxes. Most Americans cannot pay 
their mortgage or afford health care and President Bush 
wants to reward those who have the extra cash to 
speculate on the stock market. For middle-income 
families, George Bush offers warmed-over leftovers -
and he would make them wait months for them, serv-
ing his rich friends first. He still does not get it. 
138 Congo Rec. S 3385-86 (Senate March 12, 1992 Daily Ed.) 
(Emphasis added); see also id. at H 620-21 (House Feb. 26, 
1992 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Jim Moody, D-Wis., Ways 
& Means member) ("The tax bill of 1981 and a number of 
subsequent measures produced what has generally been ac-
knowledged to have been the most massive redistribution of 
wealth in this Nation."). 
33Clinton Remarks re: Educa tion and Economics, note 27 
supra. The drop in wages should be limited to drop in manu-
facturing wages, if services wages, salaries, and profits are 
included, the average wages may not have dropped. Farrell, 
"In 1992, Country Faces Stark Choice of Philosophies," Boston 
Globe, p. 1 (Sunday, Sept. 6, 1992). 
34"DSG Cites Misinformation About Reconciliation, 
Deficit Reduction Plans," electronically reproduced 93 Tax Notes 
Today 109-27 (May 21, 1993). 
3sIn the 1992 Congressional Quarterly listing of four inter-
est groups' scoring of votes, Rep. Ewing scored almost 20 
percentage points higher than the Republican average (IOO 
percent versus 80 percent or so) in the two conservative 
groups' ratings and about 12 percentage points below the 
Republican average as the liberal interest groups' ratings -
zero in the case of the ADA. I grew up in working-class 
environments in Dayton, Ohio, and the mountains of North 
Carolina (including trailer camps, center city tenements, and 
mountain shacks). I know populism. Rep . Ewing is no 
populist. 
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VI. Consumption Taxes 
If the Ewing poem was intended as an indictment 
of the Clinton tax plan for relying on nonincome taxes, 
as the plan does in part, here, too, the use of the poem 
is hypocritical. The 1990 budget accord negotiated by 
the Bush administration and a handful of congressional 
leaders takes the Mellon plan look-alike prize as to 
regressive consumption taxes. The Bush administra-
tion aided the Democratic redistribution/retribution 
for the 1980s camp in the House by (1) negotiating 
regressive excise and user taxes36 as the main revenue 
source in the 1990 "parliamentary" -like budget accord 
to meet the challenge of Ways and Means Chairman 
Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., for a $511 billion "reduction" 
in the federal deficit over a five-year period, while (2) 
providing "growth incentives" for small business, in-
cluding a targeted capital gains preference plus an 
upfront deduction for such investments as a last-
minute substitute for a generic capital gains deduc-
tion.37 A common argument was that this regressive 
distribution of the budget accord's burden a mong 
lower-, middle-, and high-income individuals would 
have continued the Reagan tax policies of the 1980s 
under which only the upper-income individuals (and 
corporations) had an increase in real income (nearly 
100 percent) and a reduction in taxes, both as to 
nominal rate and effective rates. This led to the cynical 
view that growth and investment rhetoric was a 
smokescreen for the Republicans' real agenda - taking 
36The administration's directive of no new income taxes in-
exorably resulted in the September 30, 1990, budget accord 
meeting Rostenkowski's $500 billion challenge target largely 
through raising "truly regressive" excise taxes (on gas and "sin" 
or tobacco and alcohol) and user fees (principally affecting the 
elderly, in Medicare premiums) on the revenue side of the agree-
ment. The 1990 budget accord would have increased annual 
taxes for (1) the "lower income" (less than $10,000 in taxable 
income) by 7.6 percent; (2) the lower "middle income class" 
(from $20,000 to $30,000), by 3 percent; (3) the "near rich" (those 
making over $100,000), by only 1.9 percent; and (4) the super-
rich (earning over $500,000 a year), by less than 1 percent. 
37Wessel & Birnbaum, "Consolation Prize: Tax Shelters for 
Rich Could Return in Plan to Aid Small Business," Wall Street 
Journal, A-I, col. 6 and A-18, cols. 1-3 (Tuesday, Oct. 2, 1990). 
By far the most expensive of these items would have been 
the 25-percent deduction for small-business stock ($7.3 bil-
lion over 1991-95 or over 60 percent of the a five-year total 
of $11 .5 billion). Indexing and 50-percent deduction each 
would have counted for small fractions of the total estimated 
revenue loss (minimum basis or 50-percent deduction, $700 
million over the five-year period; indexing $400 million over 
five-year period). See Hoerner, "Small Business Incentives: 
An Eight-Fold Path to Who Knows Where?," 49 Tax Notes 143 
(Oct. 8, 1990). These" growth incentives" were criticized from 
the right as too targeted and from the left as creating tax 
shelters again. Opponents denounced five months of closed-
door meetings at Andrews Air Force Base between eight con-
gressionalleaders and administration representatives as anti-
democratic and providing pork for those members while 
calling for "tough choices" by others. 
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care of the rich.38 A metaphor frequently used by the 
1990 budget accord opponents was tha t the rich were 
at the 1980s party, but now they won't have to pay.39 
(Interestingly, essentially the same rhetoric was used 
by Democratic critics of Mellon's tax cut plan in 1924.4°) 
House Democrats gleefully charged that President 
Bush would rather shut down the government than 
give up on his plan for granting more tax breaks to the 
rich in the form of a resuscitated capital gains 
preference, and that the budget accord's "growth in-
centives" further rewarded the rich for having made 
38 136 Congo Rec. at H 8057 (House Sept. 26, 1990 Daily Ed.) 
(Remarks of Rep. Barbara Boxer, D-Cal.). See Edsall & Dionne, 
note 22, supra, at C-2, col. 4 ("Republicans, who have never 
forgotten their core constituency among the wealthy, have 
been disingenuous .... They have talked one game [l ess 
government and lower taxes] and played another [income of 
middle and lower classes stagnated while income of top 1 
percent shot up 87 percent] ."). 
39136 Congo Rec. H 8829 (House Oct. 3, 1990 Daily Ed.) 
(Remarks of Rep. Major Owens, D-N.Y.); 136 Congo Rec. S 
14556-57 (Senate Oct. 4, 1990 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Senator 
Patrick Leahy, D-Vt.). Conversely rhetoric characterized the 
subsequent House Democrat alternative with an increase in 
the top permanent rate to 33 percent as making the rich pay 
for the party of the 1980s. 136 Congo Rec. H 10117 (House Oct. 
16, 1990 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Richard Lehman, 0 -
Cal.); id. at 9940, 9959 (House Oct. 16, 1990 Daily Ed .) 
(Remarks of Rep . Jolene Unsoeld, D-Wash.); id. at 10111 
(House Oct. 16, 1990 Daily Ed.) (Remarks of Rep. Ted Weiss, 
D-N.Y.); 136 Congo Rec. S 15753-54 (Sena te Oct. 18,1990 Daily 
Ed.) (Remarks of Sen. Tom Harkin, D-Iowa) ("We are asking 
those who can least afford it to pay for the mess left by the 
rich who had the party in the 1980s. I say let us make the rich 
pay for their own party they had during the last decade .") 
The apparent inspiration for the party metaphor was the S&L 
crisis. 136 Congo Rec. H 3599 (House June 14, 1990 Daily Ed .) 
(Remarks of Rep. Joseph Kennedy, D-Mass.) (commenting on 
CBO estimates of cost of S&L crisis; "[W]hy should the tax-
payer[s] have to pay for a party they were never invited to? 
It was the wealthy as a class who benefitted from the high 
interest rates caused by the S&L feeding frenzy in the 
1980s . .. . It is time we stop transferring wealth in this 
country from the poor to the rich, it is time to make the 
people who had the party pay for it. Let us end this system 
of socialism for the rich and free enterprise for the poor." ). 
4°65 Congo Rec. (Part 4) 3332-3 (House Feb. 29, 1924) 
(Remarks of Rep. Robert Crosser, D-Ohio) (" Ah, my friends, 
the real position of those who argue that it is proper for the 
government to cut down by almost a half the tax on big 
incomes, on incomes in excess of $92,000 [$708,400 in 1990 
dollars], and instead get the money by taxing more the 
people with smaller incomes, the real feeling of most men 
who want such a plan is that if we increase the wealth of 
those financially powerful, those at the top of the economic 
structure, enough will dribble down from them to help out 
those lower down .. .. During the war [WWI] thousands of 
new millionaires were added to those in the United States 
prior to the war. The present debt of the government resulted 
largely from the war. Is it then unjust that the fabulous in-
comes of the country should bear a greater proportion of the 
expense of the government than the smaller incomes?") . 
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more money in the 1980s than ever before . They 
declaimed that Reagan's 1981 "riverboat gamble"41 of 
reducing taxes at the top, including a cut in the maxi-
mum individual capital gains rate to 20 percent (while 
increasing defense spending), had tripled the deficit 
rather than reaching a balanced budget as promised, 
and had benefitted only the highest-income in-
dividuals. Of course, Bill Clinton successfully ran for 
president in 1992 on precisely this populist theme. 
41See 136 Congo Ree. H 9115 (House Oct. 6, 1990 Daily Ed.) 
(Remarks of Rep. David Obey, D-Wis.) (then-Senate Republi-
can floor leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn., called President 
Reagan's 1981 tax a "riverboat gamble," a w ager that Obey 
had not made.). 
In conclusion, I find Rep. Ewing's "populist" humor 
about as hypocritical as President George Herbert 
Walker Bush's comparison of himself, in vetoing the 
first 1992 tax bill, to President Ha rry Truman vetoing 
the 1948 tax bills. Bush's 1992 vetoes were sus tained 
by the "Conservative Coalition" of Republicans and 
conservative (largely Southern) Democrats.42 Truman 's 
1948 vetoes of tax legislation were overridden by the 
self-same Conservative Coalition. 
42For a discussion of the political science concept of "con-
servative coalition" see Lee, "Presiden t Clin ton's Capital Gain 
Proposals," 59 Tax Notes 1399, 1402 and n. 10 Uune 7, 1993). 
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